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Abstract
The inconsistency of predictions from solution concepts of conventional game theory with experimental observations is an
enduring question. These solution concepts are based on the canonical rationality assumption that people are exclusively
self-regarding utility maximizers. In this article, we think this assumption is problematic and, instead, assume that rational
economic agents act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities, which turns out to be a natural extension of the
canonical rationality assumption. Implicit utility is defined by a player’s character to reflect his personal weighting between
cooperative, individualistic, and competitive social value orientations. The player who actually faces an implicit game
chooses his strategy based on the common belief about the character distribution for a general player and the self-
estimation of his own character, and he is not concerned about which strategies other players will choose and will never feel
regret about his decision. It is shown by solving five paradigmatic games, the Dictator game, the Ultimatum game, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the Public Goods game, and the Battle of the Sexes game, that the framework of implicit game
and its corresponding solution concept, implicit equilibrium, based on this alternative assumption have potential for better
explaining people’s actual behaviors in social decision making situations.
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Introduction
Solution concepts of conventional game theory are mainly based
on the canonical rationality assumption that players are rational
economic agents who act as if they were maximizing their self-
regarding utilities. Nevertheless, increasing experimental data
support that decision makers in human society often do not act in
accordancewith predictions from these kinds ofsolutions [1–4].This
suggests that new insights and mechanisms are required to reconcile
this undeniable inconsistency between theory and experiments.
Indeed, similar cases often arise as well in many other areas of study
such as physics. Galileo, founder of modern mechanics, proposed
thatall freefalling bodies would fallthrough a vacuumwith the same
uniform acceleration, and also realized that, to explain why, as
legendhasit,the largerone ofthetwoironballshedropped fromthe
Tower of Pisa hit the ground slightly ahead of the smaller one, the
resistance from air through which the balls were falling must be
taken into account [5]. Similarly, the canonical rationality
assumption provides a unified launching pad for a large body of
theoriesineconomicsandrelatedfieldsthat workwelltosomeextent
and thus should not be given up lightly, but this does not imply that
this assumption can be readily applied to explain people’s actual
behaviors without considering the effect of real game situations they
are involved in, just as that of the air resistance on free falling balls.
So far, many efforts have been devoted to the modification or
extension of the canonical rationality assumption in game theory
with the aid of experimental observations. For instance, bounded
rationality and other-regarding preference of players are consid-
ered in behavioral game theory [4,6]. It is safe to say that people
are not exclusively self-regarding [6,7]. Costly punishment across
human societies even in one-shot game situations is a fine example
[8,9]. People also show preferences for maximizing collective
benefit or relative advantage over others’ benefits in experiments
[10,11]. However, almost all experiments are designed to be
simple and clear to make sure that all subjects have understood the
rules completely [3], so there is little sense in trying to explain
these experimental data by bounded rationality. Likewise,
evolutionary game theory cannot explain why there are subjects
in experiments who prefer to choose the strategy that is not
evolutionarily stable when they clearly know this information, such
as cooperating in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games [12]. The
solution concept based on psychological game theory invokes
psychological analysis about the motivations of other players [2].
In this article we will propose a promising solution concept which
can not only avoid these vulnerabilities, but also provide better
explanations of people’s diverse behaviors unpredicted by
conventional game theory based on the canonical rationality
assumption.
Although the experimental evidence that rational self-regarding
utility maximizers exist in chimpanzee’s societies might offer some
support for the canonical rationality assumption [13], many
experimental results show that people are heterogeneous and
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of decision makers in human society could be influenced by diverse
factors such as sex [14], age [15], emotions [16], past experience
[17], educational background [18], social distance [19], cultural
difference [3,20], and even experimental contexts [1]. For example,
economists are more likely than others to free ride in public goods
experiments [18], and there are the same players who converged to
contribute nothing in a ten-period public goods experiment without
punishment but contribute everything in a ten-period public goods
experiment with punishment [21]. ‘‘Action is character’’, wrote F.
Scott Fitzgerald, author of The Great Gatsby, in one of his
notebooks. What people do reflects what they are, and what people
are implies what they do. We propose that rationality should be
personal and related to the player’s character. No matter how
anomalous an action appears to be, it still should be thought as
rational to those who take it after deliberation.
In this article we try to formally incorporate into the solution
concept of game theory the player’s character, a parameter
encapsulating all diverse factors that may influence his decision
making. The characters of players reflect their personal weighting
between cooperative, individualistic, and competitive social value
orientations. We assume that all players have a common belief
about the character distribution for a general player, and rational
players act as if they were maximizing their character-related
utilities (that is, implicit utility we shall define later on), which turns
out to be a natural extension of the canonical rationality
assumption. In this procedure, a game is transformed into a
Bayesian game, the solution of which, Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
is referred to as implicit equilibrium of the original game. An
implicit equilibrium provides players with a concrete decision rule
which varies with their characters, and no player would feel regret
about his decision even though the outcome turns out not to be a
Nash equilibrium. The idea behind our framework turns out to be
similar to the ERC model, a theory of equity, reciprocity, and
competition [22]. But the ERC model uses equity as one of the
primitive hypotheses and fails to incorporate cooperative factors,
although it does consider players’ heterogeneity and the tension
between individualistic and competitive orientations [22]. In our
framework, equity emerges in the Ultimatum game as a natural
consequence of rational players acting as if they were maximizing
their character-related utilities.
Solution concepts based on the canonical rational assumption
also assume that it is common knowledge that each player is
rational, each player knows that all players are rational, each
player knows that each player knows that all players are rational,
and so on ad infinitum. It is probably safe to say that this is not
realistic in most cases. The concept of bounded rationality in
behavioral game theory is proposed to avoid this vulnerability [6].
Instead, in our new framework of character and implicit
equilibrium, we assume that the player facing a game situation
chooses his strategy based on the common belief about the
character distribution for a general player and the self-estimation
of his own character, irrespective of what the characters of other
players involved are, which strategies he think they will choose,
and even whether they are rational or not. Rationality in our
framework is only referred to as players maximizing their
character-related utilities, and not as players with perfect memory
and extraordinary computational capacity like supermen, and thus
there is no need to invoke such concepts as bounded rationality.
This contrast is one of the most important features of the concept
of implicit equilibrium distinct from almost all other solution
concepts proposed until now in game theory.
The concepts of character and implicit equilibrium we propose
here based on this new rationality assumption can better explain
people’s actual behaviors labeled as irrational by conventional
game theory in the experiments of some paradigmatic games. For
example, why are at least one third of the dictators willing to offer
the recipients more than zero in the Dictator game [23]? Why is it
a modal pattern that two players end up with around fifty-fifty
allocation of the pie in the Ultimatum game [3,16]? Why are there
subjects who cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game [1] and
contribute their endowments in the Public Goods game [3]? And
why do people feel well satisfied with their choices even though
they do not choose their own preferred programs simultaneously
in the Battle of the Sexes game? All these puzzling but attractive
questions are going to be given more reasonable explanations in
our new framework based on the character-related rationality
assumption that is presented subsequently.
Analysis
We begin by defining an n-player noncooperative game in
strategic form and, in passing, introducing the notations that will
be used hereafter [24]. Let I~f1,2,...,ng be the set of players,
where n is the total number of players. For each player i [ I, let si
be a strategy of his and Si be the finite set of all his strategies. A
vector s~(s1,s2,...,sn) is called a strategy profile. The set of
strategy profiles is thus the Cartesian product S~|iSi. Let
ui : S?R be the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
associated to player i and u~(u1,u2,...,un) be the combined
utility function of the game. Then a game in strategic form may be
summarized as a triplet
C~(I,S,u): ð1Þ
We decompose a player’s utility into two parts: the outward-
looking utility and the inward-looking utility. The former reflects
the benefit of the group as a whole gained from playing the game
and is the same for all players concerned, whereas the latter
reflects the relative advantage of the focal player gained over the
utilities of the other players involved in the game. A player’s
character is defined to reflect his personal weighting between the
outward-looking utility and the inward-looking utility, or equiv-
alently, his personal weighting between intergroup and intragroup
competition.
Formally, for any strategy profile s [ S, the outward-looking utility
of player i is defined as
uout
i (s)~
1
n
X n
j~1
uj(s), ð2Þ
and the inward-looking utility
uin
i (s)~ui(s){uout
i (s): ð3Þ
Based on these two new concepts, we further define the implicit
utility of player i as
u 
i (s)~(1zki)uout
i (s)z(1{ki)uin
i (s), ð4Þ
where
ki [ ½{1,1 ð 5Þ
represents player i’s character which reflects his personal weighting
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When ki~0, u 
i (s) degenerates to ui(s). For the two-player case,
u 
i (s)~ui(s)zkiuj(s) where j=i, and for the zero-sum game
where
Pn
j~1 uj(s)~0, u 
i (s)~(1{ki)ui(s). So implicit utility is
defined by a kind of utility transformation in principle.
A player’s character may take any value in the interval ½{1,1 
by definition. One with character ki~1 cares only about the
outward-looking utility and acts by team-directed reasoning to
achieve a group goal [25]. In this case the allocation of utilities
among players is irrelevant to him. One with character ki~0 cares
only about his self-regarding utility as in the canonical rationality
assumption. This makes our new framework a natural extension of
solution concepts in conventional game theory. One with
character ki~{1 cares only about the inward-looking utility,
that is, his advantage over other players. These three special cases
reflect people’s cooperative, individualistic, and competitive social
value orientations, respectively, which form the theoretical basis
for numerous studies [10].
Note that the inward-looking or outward-looking utility is
distinct from the exclusively self-regarding or other-regarding
utility. This is an issue about what factors should be considered as
the primitive assumptions about people’s instincts related to
decision making. We think that the exclusively other-regarding
preference as a primitive assumption might contradict the
principle of individuals being the unit of natural selection. The
definition of implicit utility in (4) is equivalent to
u 
i (s)~(1{ki)ui(s)z
2ki
n
X n
j~1
uj(s)
~ 1{ki 1{
2
n
     
ui(s)z
2ki
n
X
j=i
uj(s):
ð6Þ
This implies that any player i, regardless of his character ki, always
gives a positive weighting to his exclusively self-regarding utility ui,
and thus he will never show an exclusively other-regarding
preference by definition. Actually, the weighting player i gives ui is
always more than that he gives uj, where j=i,b y1{ki.
The character of a player, which reflects his personality when
facing a game situation, may vary with the contexts in which he
needs to make a decision. For example, experimental data show
that the cooperation rate usually decreases in repeated public
goods games without punishment relative to in those games with
punishment [21], which reveals that players might update their
characters by learning to adapt to particular situations. However,
considering the fact that players from some specific social context
usually follow the same code of conduct, whether religious, ethical,
or legal, we assume that,
when facing one-shot game situations without communication, all
players have a relatively stable common belief b about the character
distribution for a general player over the interval ½{1,1 .
In other words, for any focal player, b is the best of his
knowledge about other players in a one-shot game situation. As far
as the real world is concerned, we think that it might be
inappropriate to always assume that people who face a one-shot
game situation have no knowledge of the characters of other
players involved.
By incorporating players’ characters and their common belief
about the character distribution for a general player, any game
can be transformed into a Bayesian game. In particular, let
k~(k1,k2,...,kn) and u ~(u 
1,u 
2,...,u 
n). Then a Bayesian game
C ~(I,S,k,b,u ) ð7Þ
can be defined. We call C  the implicit game corresponding to C,
and its Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
ci : ½{1,1 ?Si fori~1,2,...,n, ð8Þ
the implicit equilibrium of C, which provides the player with a
concrete decision rule based on the self-estimation of his own
character, irrespective of other players’ characters. No matter
whether the outcome turns out to be a Nash equilibrium of the
game C or not, no player would feel regret about his decision and
thus no player would want to change it.
In contrast to the canonical rationality assumption, the idea
underlying this transformation is referred to as the character-related
rationality assumption; that is,
all players are rational economic agents who act as if they were
maximizing their implicit utilities.
For those players with character ki~0, this is exactly the
canonical rationality assumption, except that we do not need the
assumption that rationality is common knowledge. We expect that
the concepts of implicit game and implicit equilibrium based on
this alternative assumption can better model how decisions are
made in actual social contexts. Subsequently we apply these new
concepts to some paradigmatic game situations to show their
capability and effectiveness.
The Dictator Game
The Dictator game is about sharing a pie between two
anonymous players, in which the dictator who has complete
control over the process of allocation chooses to offer a portion of
the pie, x, to the recipient who has no choice but to accept it, and
thus leaves 1{x to himself (Table 1). This one-shot game is
designed to measure the altruism behavior of the dictator, which is
not directly associated with other plausible factors such as kinship,
reciprocity, reputation, or the immediate threat of punishment [8].
According to the canonical rationality assumption, the rational
dictator who acts as if maximizing his self-regarding utility would
take advantage of his dominant position and thus choose to offer
the recipient nothing. However, a consistent observation in
experiments is that at least one third of the dictators are willing
to offer the recipients more than zero across a wide variety of
procedures and conditions, although it is true that most of the
dictators offer nothing [23].
In contrast, the character-related rationality assumption predicts
that not all the dictators who act as if maximizing their implicit
utilities would offer nothing, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the Dictator game, (i) a rational dictator with
character k1~1 would like to offer the recipient any portion of the pie, even as
Table 1. The Dictator Game.
Dictator
Recipient
Accept
Offer x 1{x, x
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019014.t001
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offer the recipient nothing.
Proof. Suppose that the dictator, player 1, offers a portion of
the pie, x, to the recipient, player 2, and leaves 1{x to himself.
The implicit utility of player 1 is
u 
1(x)~(1zk1)(0:5)z(1{k1)(0:5{x)
~1{(1{k1)x:
ð9Þ
If k1~1 then u 
1(x):1. That is, the implicit utility of the
dictator with character k1~1 is constantly equal to 1 whatever he
gets from the allocation of the pie. So a rational dictator with
character k1~1 would like to offer any portion of the pie x to the
recipient, even as big as the whole pie.
If k1=1 then arg maxx[½0,1  u1(x)~0 and u1(0)~1. That is, a
rational dictator with character k1v1 who try to maximize his
implicit utility would offer the recipient nothing so as to get the
maximum implicit utility 1.
As a result of the recipient’s inability to influence the allocation
procedure, the implicit equilibrium presented in this proposition
does not even need the dictator and the recipient to have a
common belief b about the character distribution for a general
player.
It is worth noting that we can get xƒ
1
1{k1
by solving u 
1(x)§0
in the proof above, which means that the dictator with character
k1v1 would still be better off if he offers the recipient x not more
than minf1,
1
1{k1
g than not participating in the game, even
though he does not manage to maximize his implicit utility due to
some unknown reasons. In particular, those dictators with non-
negative characters who fail to maximize their implicit utilities
could be better off even though they offer the whole pie. This point
may be helpful to the understanding and explanation of why there
are the dictators who are willing to offer more than zero in
experiments, except that those dictators with character k1~1 who
care only about the collective benefit would anyway.
The Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum game is similar to the Dictator game. One only
difference is that, in the Ultimatum game, after the proposer offers
a portion of the pie, x, to the responder and leaves 1{x to himself,
the responder could choose either to accept it with the allocation
of the pie settled down or to reject it with two players getting
nothing (Table 2) [8]. The responder in this one-shot anonymous
game is endowed with an opportunity to punish the proposer’s
greed, but, if he did, what he does would cost him all he could
own.
According to the canonical rationality assumption, this game
has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where the proposer offers
the smallest nonzero amount and the responder accepts it, because
a rational proposer knows that the responder who maximizing his
self-regarding utility will always accept any positive offer [8].
However, experimental evidence shows that (i) the offer x
distributes over the whole interval ½0,1  [3], (ii) offers above 0.5
are rare in student subjects [26], (iii) a modal pattern is that two
players end up with around fifty-fifty allocation of the pie [3,16],
and (iv) there are the responders who accept the smallest nonzero
offer and the proposers who offer the whole pie [3].
In contrast, the character-related rationality assumption that
players act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities
provides a more reasonable explanation for all these experimental
observations.
Proposition 2. In the Ultimatum game, (i) a rational proposer with
character k1~1 would like to offer any portion of the pie not less than
maxf0,
k2
k2{1
g, even as big as the whole pie, where k2 is the character of
the responder, and the responder would accept it, and (ii) a rational proposer
with character k1v1 would offer maxf0,
k2
k2{1
g which is never more than
half the pie, and the responder would accept it.
Proof. Suppose that the proposer, player 1, offers a portion of
the pie, x, to the responder, player 2, and leaves 1{x to himself.
The implicit utility of player 1 is
u 
1(x)~(1zk1)(0:5)z(1{k1)(0:5{x)
~1{(1{k1)x,
ð10Þ
and the implicit utility of player 2 is
u 
2(x)~(1zk2)(0:5)z(1{k2)(x{0:5)
~k2z(1{k2)x:
ð11Þ
If an offer is accepted by both players, u 
1(x)§0 and u 
2(x)§0
are needed to be satisfied simultaneously. Solving these two
inequalities, we get
k2
k2{1
ƒxƒ
1
1{k1
: ð12Þ
So an offer x that exits between maxf0,
k2
k2{1
g and min
f1,
1
1{k1
g would be accepted by both players.
Because the implicit utility u 
1(x) of a proposer with character
k1~1 is constantly equal to 1 whatever he gets from the allocation
of the pie, his rational strategy is to offer any x that will be
accepted by the responder, that is, not less than maxf0,
k2
k2{1
g,
even as big as the whole pie.
The implicit utility u 
1(x) of a proposer with character k1v1
increases with x decreasing, so he would like to offer the lower
bound of the offer that the responder will accept so as to maximize
his implicit utility, that is, maxf0,
k2
k2{1
g. Since maxf0,
k2
k2{1
g
increases with k2 decreasing and reaches the maximum 0.5 when
k2~{1, a rational proposer with character k1v1 would never
offer the responder more than half the pie.
From the proof above we can also infer that the responder with
non-negative character would accept any offer x by the proposer,
since the lower bound maxf0,
k2
k2{1
g~0 when k2§0. Further-
more, since the upper bound minf1,
1
1{k1
g~1 when k1§0, the
proposer with non-negative character might offer the responder
any x, even as big as the whole pie. In these two cases players
would be better off than not participating in the game, even if they
do not manage to maximize his implicit utility due to some
Table 2. The Ultimatum Game.
Proposer Responder
Accept Reject
Offer x 1{x, x 0, 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019014.t002
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why, in experiments, the offer x distributes over the whole interval
½0,1  and there are the responders who accept the smallest nonzero
offer and the proposers who offer the whole pie.
As in the Dictator game, the implicit equilibrium presented in
this proposition does not also require the proposer and the
responder to have a common belief b about the character
distribution for a general player, because of the asymmetrical
positions of the two players in the allocation procedure. However,
close inspection will reveal that this implicit equilibrium is
inconsistent with our aforementioned presentation that, when a
player who acts as if maximizing his implicit utility chooses a
strategy, the characters of other players are irrelevant. The
strategy we give here requires the proposer to estimate the
character of the responder.
Let us dig deeper into the procedure of the proof of this
proposition. The upper bound of the offer that both players will
accept, minf1,
1
1{k1
g, decreases with the character of the
proposer k1 decreasing and reaches the minimum 0.5 when
k1~{1, while the lower bound, maxf0,
k2
k2{1
g, increases with
the character of the responder k2 decreasing and reaches the
maximum 0.5 when k2~{1. If we think of student proposers as
players who care only about their inward-looking utility and are
good at estimating responders’ characters, then this analysis can
explain why offers above 0.5 are rare in student subjects in
experiments. This analysis also gives us a far-reaching conclusion
as follows.
Proposition 3. In the Ultimatum game, half the pie is the unique offer
that would be always accepted by any two players.
Now the characters of both the proposer and the responder fade
out completely. Actually, in the case where x~0:5, solving
u 
1(x)§0 and u 
2(x)§0 gives us k1§{1 and k2§{1, which can
be satisfied by any two players by definition. This proposition
finally provides us with a perfect explanation of why around fifty-
fifty allocation of the pie is observed as a modal pattern in
experiments.
Fairness, or inequality aversion, is recognized as one of key
elements in human strategic interactions [16]. Here we show that
the proposer giving half the pie and the responder accepting it is
an implicit equilibrium, irrespective of the characters of the
proposer and the responder. Hence, fairness is achieved as a
natural consequence of two players acting as if they were
maximizing their implicit utilities, whereas in almost all other
existing theoretical models it is incorporated explicitly as one of
primitive assumptions about people’s instincts related to decision
making [10,22,26,27].
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
The best known model in game theory might be the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, which is also played between two anonymous
players (Table 3). Each player in this game can either cooperate or
defect. One cooperating would induce cost c to himself and bring
benefit b to the other. One defecting costs nothing and benefits
neither. Note that bwc is usually assumed so as to make sure that
two cooperating players can benefit more than two defecting
players. This simple model and its finitely and infinitely repeated
versions are extensively used to explore the mechanism of the
evolution of cooperation through natural selection [28].
According to the canonical rationality assumption, one in this
scenario would always defect since defecting is a dominant
strategy. That is, one can always be better off by defecting than by
cooperating, whether the other player defects or cooperates. By
backward induction, we know, even in the finitely repeated
version, defecting in all steps is the best choice. However, each
could achieve a higher utility b{c by both cooperating than 0 by
both defecting. This is why the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is often
used as a synonym for ‘‘social dilemma’’.
The predictions given by the canonical rationality assumption
contradicts experimental data. There are subjects who cooperate
even in the last round of finitely repeated situations, and the
experimental studies from 1958 to 1992 show that the cooperation
rate of players ranges from 5% to 96.9%, with a mean of 47.4%
[1]. In contrast, by the character-related rationality assumption,
one with character ki§
c
b
would cooperate in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game so as to maximize his implicit utility.
Proposition 4. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, one would cooperate
if his character ki§
c
b
, and otherwise defect, given that the two players have
any common belief about the character distribution for a general player.
Proof. For player i with character ki in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, when he cooperates, his implicit utility is
(1zki)(b{c) if the other player cooperates and otherwise
bki{c if the other player defects. When he defects, his implicit
utility is b{cki if the other player cooperates and otherwise 0 if
the other player defects.
We assume that the two players have a common belief b about
the character distribution for a general player and the character of
a player who cooperates is not less than a critical value kc. Then,
the expected implicit utility of player i cooperating is
u 
i (C)~ (1zki)(b{c)Prfkj§kcg
z(bki{c)(1{Prfkj§kcg),
ð13Þ
where Prfkj§kcg is the probability of the other player j
cooperating, and the expected implicit utility of player i defecting is
u 
i (D)~(b{cki)Prfkj§kcg: ð14Þ
Solvingu 
i (C)§u 
i (D),wegetki§
c
b
.Sokc~
c
b
.Inotherwords,itis
an implicit equilibrium that a player cooperates when his character
ki§
c
b
, and otherwise defects.
This implicit equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that it works
for either player. No player would feel regret even if he chooses to
cooperate and the other player chooses to defect, although this
outcome is not a Nash equilibrium. From this implicit equilibrium
we can also infer that the players would tend to defect when c is
near b, because the portion of people with character ki§
c
b
becomes far less whatever the character distribution for a general
player is.
Cooperation is considered as a third fundamental principle
of evolution beside mutation and natural selection [29]. The
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is used to describe cooperation
between unrelated individuals. If the probability of another
encounter between the same individuals exceeds the cost-to-
Table 3. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
Focal player Another player
Cooperate (C) Defect (D)
Cooperate (C) b{c {c
Defect (D) b 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019014.t003
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c
b
, cooperation can evolve [29]. Now this proposition
identifies
c
b
as an important parameter in the one-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, either. If the player self-estimates that his
character exceeds
c
b
then he would cooperate. These two
conclusions complement each other perfectly.
The Public Goods Game
In the Public Goods game, each of n players is endowed with
one unit of utility and secretly decides whether to contribute it into
the public pot or to free ride. The umpire will multiply the sum of
contributions in the pot by a number r greater than 1 and smaller
than n, and then split the total utility equally among all players,
irrespective of whether they contribute or not (Table 4) [30]. This
game can be considered as an extension of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game to the n-player situation [30]. In particular, when there are
only two players, the Public Goods game is equivalent to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with b~
r
2
and c~1{
r
2
.
According to the canonical rationality assumption, a rational
player in this scenario would free ride since free riding is a
dominant strategy. One will incur a loss of 1{
r
n
units of utility by
contributing whatever others do. However, each of n players could
benefit most and get utility r from all players contributing. This
makes it a social dilemma essentially the same as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game.
In the Public Goods game experiments where players are per-
mitted to contribute any fraction of their endowments, the mean con-
tributions usually end up with between 40% and 60% [3]. Although
the definition of the Public Goods game in these experiments is not
exactlythe same as that given above, the data surely reflects that those
subjects are not exclusively self-regarding utility maximizer. By the
character-related rationality assumption that players act as if they
were maximizing their implicit utilities, we may give a more
reasonable solution to the Public Goods game defined here.
Proposition 5. In the Public Goods game, one would contribute his
endowment if his character ki§
n{r
nzr{2
, and otherwise he would free ride,
given that all players have any common belief about the character distribution
for a general player.
Proof. We use C and D to denote two strategies of the player,
contributing his endowment and free riding, respectively. For any
given player i0 [ I, when there are m players using strategy C, the
outward-looking utility of player i0 using strategy D is
uout
i0 (D,m)~
1
n
(n{m)
mr
n
zm
mr
n
{1
   hi
~
m
n
(r{1),
ð15Þ
and the inward-looking utility is
uin
i0(D,m)~
mr
n
{uout
i0 (D,m)~
m
n
: ð16Þ
Then we can work out the implicit utility of player i0 using strategy
D when there are m players using strategy C, which is
u 
i0(D,m)
~ (1zki0)uout
i0 (D,m)z(1{ki0)uin
i0(D,m)
~
mr
n
z
m(r{2)
n
ki0:
ð17Þ
We assume that all n players have a common belief b about the
character distribution for a general player and the character of a
player using strategy C is not less than a critical value kc. Hence
the expected implicit utility of player i0 using strategy D is
u 
i0(D)~
X n{1
m~0
n{1
m
  
pm(1{p)
n{1{mu 
i0(D,m), ð18Þ
where p~Prfki§kcg is the probability of any player i using
strategy C.
For any given player i0 [ I, when there are m players using
strategy C, the outward-looking utility of player i0 using strategyC is
uout
i0 (C,m)~
1
n
(n{1{m)
(mz1)r
n
 
z(mz1)
(mz1)r
n
{1
    
~
mz1
n
(r{1),
ð19Þ
and the inward-looking utility is
uin
i0(C,m)~
(mz1)r
n
{1{uout
i0 (C,m)
~
mz1
n
{1:
ð20Þ
Thenwecanworkouttheimplicitutilityofplayeri0 usingstrategyC
when there are m players using strategy C, which is
u 
i0(C,m)
~ (1zki0)uout
i0 (C,m)z(1{ki0)uin
i0(C,m)
~
mr
n
z
r
n
{1
  
z
m(r{2)
n
z
r{2
n
z1
  
ki0:
ð21Þ
Hence the expected implicit utility of player i0 using strategy C is
u 
i0(C)~
X n{1
m~0
n{1
m
  
pm(1{p)
n{1{mu 
i0(C,m): ð22Þ
For solving u 
i0(C)§u 
i0(D), we calculate
u 
i0(C){u 
i0(D)~
r
n
{1
  
zki0
r{2
n
z1
     
|
X n{1
m~0
n{1
m
 !
pm(1{p)
n{1{m
~
r
n
{1
  
zki0
r{2
n
z1
  
:
ð23Þ
Table 4. The Public Goods Game.
Focal player
Other n{1 players
m contribute (C)
Contribute (C) (mz1)r=n{1
Free ride (D) mr=n
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019014.t004
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n{r
nzr{2
by solving u 
i0(C){u 
i0(D)§0.S o
kc~
n{r
nzr{2
. That is, it is an implicit equilibrium that a player
would contribute his endowment if his character ki§
n{r
nzr{2
,
and otherwise he would free ride.
The implicit equilibrium in this proposition is also symmetric
and works for all players. For the two-player case, the critical value
n{r
nzr{2
is consistent with
c
b
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with
b~
r
2
and c~1{
r
2
. Note that the limit of
n{r
nzr{2
is 1 as r
approaches 1 or n is very large relative to r, so the probability of
players contributing his endowment is extremely low. In other
words, the player tends to free ride when the multiplication factor
r is small or the number of the players involved, n, is large.
Note that the implicit equilibria of the Dictator game and the
Ultimatum game are not related to the players’ common belief b
about the character distribution for a general player. The implicit
equilibria of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Public Goods
game do, but not to what the common belief b itself is. In general
these are not the case, for instance, as shown below in the Battle of
the Sexes game.
The Battle of the Sexes Game
In the Battle of the Sexes game [2], one of two anonymous
players prefers to watch soccer, whereas the other prefers to watch
opera. Each player can get one unit of utility by watching his
preferred program and additional x units by getting the other for
company (Table 5). When xw
1
2
, these two players as a whole will
be better off by watching the same program, either soccer or
opera, than by watching different ones. This game is a formal
representation of coordination problems which are widespread in
life, such as choosing which side of the road to drive and what gifts
to exchange like the young couple in the story of The Gift of the
Magi by O. Henry. Another well-known game that essentially has
the same coordination nature as the Battle of the Sexes game is the
Stag Hunt game [2].
According to the canonical rationality assumption, this game
has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: both watching soccer or
both watching opera. In addition, this game has a mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium; that is, each player watches his preferred
program with probability
1
2
1z
1
x
  
and the other player’s
preferred program with probability
1
2
1{
1
x
  
. When this game
is played once without communication, multiple Nash equilibria
can not give players much instruction, and disequilibrium may
result. In contrast, the character-related rationality assumption
that players act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities
can provide players with a more concrete strategy of play, given
that they have a common belief b about the character distribution
for a general player.
Proposition 6. In the Battle of the Sexes game, one would watch the
other player’s preferred program if his character ki§
1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1z
4
x
r
{1
 !
, and
otherwise his own preferred program, given that both players believe that the
character of a general player is uniformly distributed over the interval ½{1,1 .
Proof. For two players, i and j, in the Battle of the Sexes
game, when player i watches his preferred program, his implicit
utility is (1zx)zkix if player j accompanies him and otherwise
1zki if player j watches his own preferred program. When player
i watches player j’s preferred program, his implicit utility is
xzki(1zx) if player j accompanies him and otherwise 0 if player
j watches player i’s preferred program.
We assume that the two players have a common belief b about
the character distribution for a general player and player i would
watch player j’s preferred program when ki§kc. The expected
implicit utility of player i watching the other player j’s preferred
program is
u 
i (Other)~(xzkizkix)(1{Prfkj§kcg), ð24Þ
where Prfkj§kcg is the probability of player j watching player i’s
preferred program. The expected implicit utility of player i
watching his own preferred program is
u 
i (Own)~ (1zxzkix)Prfkj§kcg
z(1zki)(1{Prfkj§kcg):
ð25Þ
Solving u 
i (Other)§u 
i (Own) gives us
x(1{2Prfkj§kcg)ki§1{xz2xPrfkj§kcg: ð26Þ
Further we assume that both players believe that the character
of a general player is uniformly distributed over the interval
½{1,1 , which leads to Prfkj§kcg~
1{kc
2
. Substituting it into
the above inequality gives us
(kiz1)kcx§1: ð27Þ
Considering that xw0 and ki [ ½{1,1 , one necessary condition
for this inequality to be justifiable is kcw0. So we can get
ki§
1
kcx
{1: ð28Þ
Setting
1
kcx
{1~kc and solving it give us kc~
1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1z
4
x
r
{1
 !
.
Thus it is an implicit equilibrium that one would watch the other
player’s preferred program if his character ki§
1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1z
4
x
r
{1
 !
,
and otherwise he would watch his own preferred program.
The procedure of proof shows that the implicit equilibrium in
the Battle of the Sexes game is closely related to the players’
common belief b about the character distribution for a general
player. As an alternative, if we assume that both players believe
that the character of a player is uniformly distributed over the
interval ½0,1 , then Prfkj§kcg~1{kc. Then the same procedure
as in the proof above leads to kc~
1
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9z
8
x
r
{1
 !
. Conse-
quently, we arrive at the following conclusion.
Table 5. The Battle of the Sexes Game.
Focal player Another player
Opera (Own) Soccer (Other)
Soccer (Own) 11 zx
Opera (Other) x 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019014.t005
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other player’s preferred program if his character ki§
1
4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9z
8
x
r
{1
 !
, and
otherwise his own preferred program, given that both players believe that the
character of a general player is uniformly distributed over the interval ½0,1 .
Under both assumptions about the players’ common belief b
about the character distribution for a general player, the implicit
equilibria are symmetric and works for either player. Further, we
can expect that one will watch the other player’s preferred
program with probability
1
4
3{
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1z
4
x
r  !
in the first case,
and with probability
1
4
5{
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9z
8
x
r  !
in the second case. Yet we
have to emphasize that no player feels regret in implicit
equilibrium even if they watch different programs, that is, they
simultaneously choose to watch their own or the other player’s
preferred programs. This is totally distinct from Nash equilibrium
where both players watching different programs is considered as
disequilibrium in which they feel regret and want to change their
strategies.
When additional utility x from the company of the other player
is extremely large (or extremely small), the implicit equilibria in
both cases predict that the probability of one watching the other
player’s preferred program would approach
1
2
(or 0). These are
consistent with the predictions of the mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium which says this probability is
1
2
1{
1
x
  
. Nevertheless,
when x is between
1
2
and 1, the three Nash equilibria degenerate to
one where each player would watch his own preferred program
with certain, although these two players as a whole can still be
better off by both watching soccer or both watching opera. In
contrast, we can expect that one will watch the other player’s
preferred program with positive probability by the predictions of
the implicit equilibria under both assumptions above. This point
adds to the evidence that the implicit equilibrium might be more
reasonable than the three Nash equilibria in the Battle of the Sexes
game.
Results and Discussion
The inconsistency of predictions from solution concepts of
conventional game theory with experimental observations is an
enduring question. By clearly taking the player’s heterogeneity into
consideration, we have shown in five paradigmatic games, the
Dictator game, the Ultimatum game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, the Public Goods game, and the Battle of the Sexes game,
that the concepts of implicit game and implicit equilibrium have
potential for better explaining people’s actual behaviors in social
decision making situations. This theoretical framework is based on
the so-called character-related rationality assumption that rational
economic agents act as if they were trying to maximize their
implicit utilities. The cooperative, individualistic, and competitive
social value orientations are incorporated as three special cases
where the player’s character equals 1, 0, and {1, respectively
[10]. The player chooses his strategy based on the common belief
about the character distribution for a general player and the self-
estimation of his own character, and he is not concerned about
which strategies other players will choose and will never feel regret
about his decision.
The concept of character reflects players’ heterogeneity,
although it does not explicitly consider complicated psychological
motivations as in psychological game theory [2]. The ERC model
does consider players’ heterogeneity and the tension between
individualistic and competitive orientations, but fails to incorpo-
rate cooperative factors [22]. The concept of implicit utility is
basically a kind of utility transformation, but it is based on the
player’s self-estimation of his own character, rather than on some
inflexible parameters that are supposed to be imposed on all
players as in other models [10]. We suppose that the character-
related rationality assumption as a natural extension of the
canonical rationality assumption is the consequence of evolution,
and surely we do not explicitly consider its evolutionary process as
in evolutionary game theory [12] or bounded rationality as in
behavioral game theory [6].
However, as aforementioned, a player’s character could be
influenced by so many factors that it seems to be a big question
how to measure it. Even if this is the case, incorporating the
player’s character in analyzing games would no doubt be useful to
explain people’s diverse behaviors in decision making as we shown
here. At this point it may be suitable to mention another fact from
physics. The temperature of an object is also influenced by many
complicated factors, yet now we can conveniently measure it using
a thermometer. Likewise, constructing a proper procedure, or
even a convenient device, to measure the character of a player
facing a game situation is a promising and challenging project.
Another interesting issue is how the character of a player
(consequently his strategy) evolves in repeated game situations
with new information about the strategies of other players in
previous plays. The progress in either direction would further
extend our understanding about the reason people cooperate in
social dilemmas and the way decisions are actually made.
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